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Abstract 
The domino sequences found in major accidents have been analyzed for a large set of 
cases (330); the first event triggering the domino effect was an explosion or a fire, both 
with approximately the same contribution; the same proportion has been found when all 
domino effect steps were considered. Although fire effects usually reach a distance much 
shorter than those of an explosion, as fire is the most frequent major accident it is often 
found as the first step of domino sequences. This is especially true in the case of BLEVEs. 
Both in fixed plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials, in the event of a fire, 
if flames affect a vessel and the fireproofing layer has been damaged, a BLEVE can occur 
at any moment. 127 BLEVE accidents involving domino effect have been analyzed. It 
has been found that fire is significantly more frequent than explosion, both in triggering 
the domino effect sequence and in intermediate steps. The time to failure can range from 
one minute or even less up to several hours, an aspect that should be very important for 
the management of the emergency. A set of conclusions are inferred from this survey. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The interest on the domino effect has increased significantly in recent years. The 
experience has shown that in many major accidents, this effect has played an important 
role in enlarging the severity of the accident both in fixed plants and in the transportation 
of hazardous materials by road or rail. Thus, a first event –a fire, an explosion– can lead 
after a relatively short time to a second one, and then to a third one. Depending on the 
circumstances (for example, the congestion of a plant or the number of rail cars involved 
in a derailment) this effect can lead to a catastrophic series of explosions and/or fires or 
toxic releases. This can have severe consequences on the population and, more frequently, 
on firefighters, increasing as well the materials losses. 
The first event in a domino effect sequence is usually an explosion or a fire: thermal 
radiation or flames impingement, or overpressure and ejected fragments, can damage 
equipment, originating a further loss of containment and, therefore, the escalation of the 
accident. These two accidents have approximately the same contribution when large sets 
of cases are analyzed. However, in the specific case of BLEVEs the situation changes 
significantly, fire having a much more significant role. 
If a vessel containing a pressurized liquid is subjected to the effects of a fire, there is a 
certain possibility that, depending on the circumstances, it explodes after a time. This can 
happen even if the vessel is equipped with active or passive protection, and with pressure 
relief valves; and it can occur almost immediately or after more than one hour from the 
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starting of the fire. BLEVEs are important because this is a type of accident that happens 
from time to time, both in fixed plants or in the transportation by rail or road; and, 
unfortunately, we must accept that it will continue occurring, as the number of units which 
can undergo it is very high and still increasing, especially in transportation. However, a 
better knowledge of this phenomenon can help both in decreasing its frequency and in 
reaching a better management of the emergency.   
This paper analyzes the incidence of fire as a primary event, as well as the domino effect 
sequences found in this type of accident. 
 
2. Most common events triggering or maintaining domino sequences 
 
As emphasized by several authors, the most frequent major accidents in both industrial 
plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials are fires. In an extensive historical 
survey performed on 5325 accidents occurred in chemical plants and in transportation, 
Vílchez et al. [1] found the following proportion for fire/explosion/gas cloud: 3.6 / 3 / 1. 
Another analysis on 1932 accidents occurred during the transportation by road and rail 
[2] showed that 1 out of every 3.5 led to a fire and 1 out of every 9.5 accidents led to an 
explosion. Therefore, fire can be considered the most frequent major accident. 
If accidents involving domino effect are considered, an interesting aspect is the analysis 
of the initiating step, i.e., the primary event of the domino effect sequence. Here, fire and 
explosion are the dominant issues, their physical effects being clearly aggressive with 
respect to equipment. Instead, toxic clouds, even though they can affect relatively large 
areas, cannot provoke any significant damage to installations. 
Diverse authors have recently analyzed the respective contributions of explosions and 
fires as primary events in a domino effect. Darbra et al. [3] analyzed 225 domino effect 
accidents occurred in process/storage plants and in the transportation of hazardous 
materials, and found that fire was the initiating step in 52% of cases and explosion (of 
any type) in 48%. Abdolhamizadeh et al. [4] studied 224 accidents, in which fire was the 
initiating event in 43% of cases and explosion in 57%. More recently, Hemmatian et al. 
[5] performed a historical survey on 330 domino effect accidents, finding that explosion 
was the primary event in 53% of cases and fire in 47%. 
This last survey, which analyzed the largest set of domino effect accidents, gives an 
interesting opportunity to see the significance of fire as a domino effect agent, both in 
primary and secondary levels. Figure 1 (modified from [5]), shows that secondary-level 
accidents were distributed as follows: 194 fires, 127 explosions and 9 toxic releases; 
among accidents which generated a third-level domino accident, 35 were fires and 13 
explosions. If all domino effect phenomena in this tree are taken into account, it is seen 
that 190 were originated by fires and 188 by explosions. 
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Fig. 1. Fire and explosion in triggering and maintaining domino effect sequences 
(modified from [5]). 
 
 
Thus, from these data it can be concluded that the respective contributions of fire and 
explosion in triggering or maintaining a domino effect sequence are similar. This 
conclusion could seem not to be in good agreement with the aforementioned fact that fires 
are clearly more frequent than explosions. However, it must be taken into account that 
the reach of the destructive effects of an explosion –blast and ejected fragments– is 
usually significantly larger than that of the effects (flames engulfment, thermal radiation) 
of most fires; thus, the possibility that an explosion damages other equipment is often 
higher than that associated to a fire. 
 
 
 
 
3. Effects of fire on a vessel 
 
When a vessel is subjected to a fire, its effects will depend on the type of fire, especially 
on the thermal flux released, and on whether the equipment is exposed only to thermal 
radiation or there is flames impingement. As for the consequences, they will depend on 
the duration of the fire and on the equipment features: design (shape, wall thickness), 
filling degree and existence of protective measures. 
 
3.1. Pool and tank fires 
Pool and tank fires can last long time; if their thermal radiation reaches another relatively 
close equipment, unless this is adequately protected –both thermal insulation and water 
deluge can be a good protection in this situation– the conditions for failure could be 
reached. 
In this type of fires, the combustion is rather bad due to poor air entrainment (the flow 
velocity in the flames is usually less than 10 m s-1 [7]). Flames are composed of relatively 
bright zones, with a high concentration of incandescent soot, and other zones covered by 
black smoke; both zones contribute to thermal radiation, bright zones having the highest 
emissive power (E). For the non-luminous (smoke covered) zones, Muñoz et al. [8], 
working with gasoline and diesel oil, found a value of Esoot = 40 kW m-2, independent of 
the pool diameter and of the type of fuel. For the luminous, bright zones, they found Elum 
values ranging between 80 and 120 kW m-2, depending on the pool diameter and the type 
of fuel. The fraction of the fire surface covered by the luminous flame depends on the 
type of fuel, although an approximate value of 0.4 can be assumed; this would imply an 
approximate value for the whole fire surface of E = 60 kW m-2. Moorhouse and Pritchard 
[9] suggested that with large pool fires of hydrocarbons, excluding liquefied gases, E is 
unlikely to exceed this value. Other values have also been proposed: API 521 [10] 
suggests 80 – 100 kW m-2; Mizner and Eyre [11] obtained surface emissive powers of 35 
kW m-2 for kerosene, 48 kW m-2 for LPG and 153 kW m-2 for LNG. 
However, the radiation intensity decreases quickly as the distance from the flame surface 
increases, and the heat load on a given equipment will usually be much lower than these 
values.  
If there is flame engulfment of an equipment, heat transfer will be the sum of two 
contributions, radiation and convection. Different values have been proposed; heat fluxes 
in the range of 95 – 130 kW m-2 have been measured for kerosene [12], 80 – 150 kW m-
2 for JP-4 [13], 100-180 kW m-2 as a general range for liquid hydrocarbons and 150 – 250 
kW m-2 for LPG pool fires [14, 15]. This can lead to rather high temperature increase 
rates of the vessel wall above the liquid level. 
If there is flame impingement, deluge systems require high flow rates; adequate thermal 
insulation can give a good protection.  
 
3.2. Jet fires 
Jet fires thermal characteristics depend on the fuel and on the outlet velocity. Low 
pressure releases of liquid or two-phase mixtures give low velocity flames and bad 
combustion, a situation relatively close to that of a pool fire. If the velocity is high, air 
entrainment is important and this improves the combustion; however, with two-phase 
flow, the flame is still sooty and bright and the radiation mechanism dominates. Instead, 
with gas sonic flow –gas jet fires are often sonic and very turbulent– the combustion is 
very good and the flame is almost transparent, convection being much more important 
than radiation. This behavior has an important influence on the value of the flame surface 
emissive power; for propane, Palacios et al [16] obtained values of approximately E = 80 
kW m-2 for gas jets and E = 230 kW m-2 for two-phase flow jet fires.  
The thermal radiation intensity decreases significantly with the distance, but if there is 
impingement of the flames on a surface, very high heat fluxes occur. Impinging on a solid 
surface modifies significantly the shape of the flame, increasing the area of contact with 
the equipment. Accurate values cannot be predicted and a wide range of heat fluxes has 
been proposed; the following ones can be assumed [17]: 
− natural gas: 50 – 300 kW m-2; average: 200 kW m-2 
− propane gas, sonic: 300 kW m-2   
− propane, two-phase flow: 150 – 220 kW m-2  
− propane, two-phase flow, low velocity: 150 kW m-2. 
If these heat fluxes impinge on a non-wetted wall, the temperature increase is so quick 
that the vessel can fail in a very short time. 
 
3.3. Fireballs 
The thermal radiation intensity from a fireball can be very strong at short distances. 
Flames surface emissive power depends on the fuel and is usually significantly higher 
than that of a pool fire, as practically all the fireball surface is covered by bright flames. 
Moorhouse and Pritchard [9] suggested a range of 150 – 300 kW m-2, although it can be 
as high as 350 kW m-2 for LPG. As the duration is short, protected equipment subjected 
to it will not fail; unprotected equipment could fail in some cases, but the probability is 
rather low due to the short exposure time. If there is flame impingement, heat fluxes can 
be in the range 200 – 350 kW m-2 [18, 19]. In this case, water deluge systems are not 
efficient due to the turbulence of flames, but fireproofing layers are efficient; again, the 
contact time will be generally very short as the fireball will rise from the ground level, 
and the probability of failure must be considered rather low. 
 
3.4. Flash fires 
The contact time with the equipment is so short that the probability of originating a 
domino effect is usually negligible, except for floating roof tanks (in this case, a flash fire 
could originate a tank fire) [6]. 
A summary of the approximate ranges of heat fluxes and surface emissive power for the 
diverse types of fire can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Approximate ranges of heat fluxes and surface emissive power. 
Type of fire E, kW m-2  Flame engulfment/impingement heat flux, kW m-2 
Pool, tank Hydrocarbons: 40 – 100 
LNG: 150 – 200 
LPG:50 – 120 
 
80 – 180 
180 – 260 
150 – 250 
 
Jet (LPG) 
 
Two-phase: 230 
Gas: 80 
150 – 220 
200 – 350 
 
Fireball 
 
150 – 350 
 
-- 
 
Flash fire 
 
LNG, LPG: 125 – 280 
 
-- 
   
 
 
4. Heating rate of vessel wall 
 
When a vessel undergoes the effects of a fire, the situation can change dramatically 
depending on two circumstances: i) the vessel wall has or not a thermal insulation layer; 
ii) the vessel wall is in contact with a liquid or with a vapor. 
The existence of a passive protection –a thermal insulation layer– should in principle 
imply that the vessel wall temperature will not increase up to dangerous values. However, 
if this protection does not exist or –as often happens– it has been destroyed by a 
mechanical action (erosion by a turbulent jet, the impact by a fragment from an explosion, 
a traffic accident in the case of a road or rail tanker), the wall is directly exposed to the 
fire effects. 
In such circumstances, the situation can again significantly change depending on whether 
the wall is wetted by the liquid contained in the vessel or it is in contact with the vapor 
above the liquid level. 
If the wall is wetted by liquid, its temperature will be close to that of the liquid and thus 
it will be protected and will not lose strength. However, if the wall is above the liquid 
level, i.e. it is in contact with the vapor, cooling by convection will be very poor and its 
temperature will increase rather quickly. The wall heat-up will be especially important if 
the vessel is engulfed by the flames. Figure 2 shows the evolution of wall temperature for 
an empty vessel located on a pool fire [20]. With the initial development of the fire, the 
wall temperature increases quickly (3.5 ºC s-1 for the hexane pool, 5.8 ºC s-1 for the 
kerosene pool); in a second stage, with a fully developed fire, fire-induced wind reduced 
somewhat the wall heating rate: 1.3 ºC s-1 for the hexane pool, 3.6 ºC s-1 for the kerosene 
pool. In all cases the rate at which the temperature rises is very high, implying that in very 
short time the wall can be heated in such a way that, due to the weakening of the material, 
it will not stand the inside pressure. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Temperature evolution as a function of time in a non-wetted wall of a vessel 
engulfed in a pool fire: a) pool fire of hexane, 4m2, lower lateral wall; b) pool fire of 
kerosene, 12 m2, lower lateral wall [20]. 
 
The pressure inside the vessel will increase due to the fire heating of the wall surface 
wetted by the liquid [21]. For example, a rail tank car filled to 94%, engulfed in a 
hydrocarbon pool fire, was pressurized up to the safety relief valve set pressure in 
approximately 2 minutes [22]. 
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However, even if the pressure relief valve opens, it could not prevent the vessel explosion 
if the vapor space wall has been heated up to too high temperatures; furthermore, the 
release through the pressure relief valve implies that the liquid level continuously 
decreases, and thus the vapor surface impinged by fire increases more and more.  Of 
course, if the valve action delays the explosion, the mass involved in it will be smaller 
and the effects will be less severe. 
The aforementioned heating rates can be significantly higher if there is impingement of 
the flames from a highly turbulent jet fire, as in this case the heat flux will be much more 
important. 
 
5. BLEVEs and domino effect sequences 
 
A historical analysis was performed on accidents involving a BLEVE event. The Major 
Hazard Incident Data Service [22] database was used, as well as Analysis, Research and 
Information on Accidents [3], Major Accident Reporting System [4] and Failure and 
Accidents Technical Information System [25]. The lack of information in some accidents 
was fulfilled by getting assistance of other available resources like the U. S. National 
Transport Safety Board-Chemical Safety Board [26] and the U. S. National Fire 
Protection Association [27]. 
To establish if an accident was or not a BLEVE, here the definition of BLEVE proposed 
by CCPS [28] was applied: “a sudden loss of containment of a pressure-liquefied gas 
existing above its normal atmospheric boiling point at the moment of its failure, which 
results in rapidly expanding vapor and flashing liquid”. This definition is quite similar to 
the one published by Walls (one of the three authors who first used the BLEVE acronym): 
a failure of a major container into two or more pieces, occurring at a moment in time 
when the contained liquid is at a temperature well above its boiling point at normal 
atmospheric pressure” [29]. This means that no distinction was considered on the basis 
of the material temperature being or not higher than the superheat limit. It should be clear 
that a BLEVE is just a mechanical explosion (its effects being blast and ejected 
fragments) and not a fireball, even though if the material released by the BLEVE is 
flammable, a fireball will usually occur immediately after the explosion. 
 
The criteria used for the selection of accidents were the following: 
− Only accidents occurred after 1st January 1960 were taken into account; before this 
date both the industrial plants and the transportation were essentially different from 
the present ones. 
− The survey considered accidents occurred in process plants, in storage areas or in 
transportation (road, rail and ship); it also included accidents that had occurred because 
of natural events such as earthquakes or floods. 
− Accidents occurred in military premises were not considered. 
 
Finally, a set of 167 BLEVE accidents was selected according to these criteria. The 
analysis of these cases allowed the identification of those accidents in which a domino 
effect sequence occurred. In 40 accidents, a BLEVE occurred as a single accident; in 127 
cases a domino sequence was found and the corresponding information was statistically 
treated. 
 
 
 
Table 2. General origin of BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
General origin No. of accidents Overall percentage (%) 
Transport 60 47 
Storage area 39 31 
Transfer 22 17 
Process plant 12 9 
Domestic/commercial premises 6 5 
Other 4 3 
Total 143 112 
 
The type of plant or activity in which these 127 accidents occurred can be seen in Table 
2; the overall number of accidents (143) is larger than that of real accidents because some 
of them can be included in two different origins (for example, “transfer” and “storage 
area”). Practically half of the accidents occurred during transportation, followed by 
storage, transfer and process plants. It is interesting to note the high contribution of 
transfer operations (22 accidents); this had been already found in other historical surveys 
[1, 5]. As for the specific origin (Table 3), rail tankers were the most common, followed 
by pressurized storage vessel and road tanker. Here again there are some misleading data; 
for example, in Table 2, 60 accidents correspond to “transport”, while in Table 3 rail and 
road tanker plus ship accidents sum 65. This is due to the coincidence of both “transfer” 
and “transport” in several accidents in the MHIDAS database, which criterion has been 
kept here. 
 
Table 3. Specific origin of BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
Specific origin No. of accidents Percentage (%) 
Rail tanker 40 31 
Pressurized storage vessel 24 19 
Road tanker 22 17 
Portable transport containers 17 13 
On plant pipes and associated valves 6 5 
Atmospheric pressure storage vessels 5 4 
Heat exchangers 4 3 
Reactor 3 2 
Ship 3 2 
Hose 3 2 
Other 8 7 
Total 135 105 
 
The substances involved in the accidents have been summarized in Table 4. The resulting 
overall number of accidents (199) is again much larger than that of real accidents because 
in many of them diverse substances were involved (e.g., in a train accident occurred in 
2000 in Louisiana, dichloropropane, toluene diisocyanate, sodium hydroxide, ethylene 
oxide, acrylic acid and methyl chloride were involved). LPG was clearly the most 
frequent substance, followed by oil and other hydrocarbons; only four cases were found 
in which LNG was involved. 
 
Table 4. Substances involved in BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
Substance No. of accidents Percentage (%) 
LPG 90 71 
Oil/Gasoline/Petrol/Diesel/Kerosene 14 12 
Vinyl Chloride 10 8 
Ethylene Oxide 7 6 
LNG 4 3 
Propylene 4 3 
Other chemical substances 70 56 
Total 199 159 
 
As for the general cause of the accidents (Table 5), practically two over five of them were 
due to an impact; this cause was found mainly in transportation. This was followed by 
other external events, mechanical failure and human factor, respectively. 
 
Table 5. General causes of accidents 
General cause No. of accidents Percentage (%) 
Impact failure 52 47 
External events 39 35 
Human factor 31 28 
 
Mechanical failure 
 
30 
 
28 
Instrument failure 5 5 
Violent reaction 5 5 
Services failure 1 1 
Total 163 148 
 
The significance of fire in the BLEVE sequences can be seen in Fig. 3. In 88 cases (69%) 
a fire was the first step, while in 33 cases the first event was directly a BLEVE. A typical 
scenario was a road or rail accident with a release of a flammable substance, quickly 
ignited; the flames travelled back to the release source, leading to a jet fire which, after a 
certain time, provoked the explosion of the vessel. If all domino effect steps in the 
analyzed sequences are considered, then 97 fires and 57 explosions leading to another 
event are found. Here again is seen the larger contribution of fire as compared to that of 
explosion. 
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Fig. 3. Domino effect sequences in BLEVE accidents. 
 
The explosion following the fire was in most cases the closing event of the sequence; this 
is a logical sequence in the case of one road tanker. However, in a few ones it led to 
another explosion or to another fire. In those accidents in which the accidental sequence 
started with a BLEVE, this could lead to a fire (in most cases) or to another explosion. Of 
course, the complexity of the possible sequences depends on the plant arrangement or on 
the number of rail tankers involved in the accident. As a whole, the sequence fire  
explosion was found in 97 cases in the event tree (Fig. 3), while explosion  another 
event occurred only in 57 cases. It should also be noted that in a few, very unusual cases, 
the vessel can fail without exploding but releasing a large jet fire [30]. 
 
6. Time to failure 
 
When an equipment is subjected to the effects of a fire, the time to failure is a very 
important aspect from the point of view of emergency management. Thirty years ago it 
was generally believed that when a pressurized vessel was subjected to direct contact with 
flames –a situation that could originate an explosion– about 25-30 minutes were available 
to try to solve the situation; after that time, the explosion could occur at any moment and 
therefore firefighters should move away. This false belief costed the life of many people, 
most of them firefighters. It is now well known that in the aforementioned situation, 
depending on the circumstances, the explosion can occur after a few minutes from the 
start of the fire action, or even after a shorter time. In the San Juanico accident (Mexico, 
1984), the first BLEVEs occurred 70 seconds after the first jet fires appeared; in the 
accident occurred in Nijmegen (The Netherlands) in 1978, a tanker of LPG exploded at a 
filling station just 3 minutes after fire started underneath during unloading. However, the 
time to failure can be significantly higher: in the accident occurred in Zarzalico (Spain, 
2011), an LNG road tanker was exposed to a very strong fire during approximately 
seventy minutes before the explosion occurred [31]. Table 6 gives the time to failure for 
a series of accidents involving fireBLEVE domino sequences [22]. 
 
  
Table 6. Time to failure for different cases (fixed plants and transportation). 
 
 
Diverse circumstances can have a significant influence on the value of the time to failure; 
for example, it will increase with the mass contained in the vessel; however, two aspects 
can have a significant influence: 
a) Whether the flames impinge on the vessel wall below the liquid level (tank wall being 
therefore refrigerated by the liquid) or above it; in this later case, if there is no passive 
protection, wall temperature will increase significantly and its tensile strength will 
decrease, what can eventually lead to the vessel burst in a relatively short time.  
Date Place Sequence Material Time to failure 
1984 Mexico VCEJet fireBLEVEFire LPG sphere 70 seconds 
1978 Netherlands FireBLEVE LPG 3 minutes 
1961 USA FireBLEVEFire LPG cylinder 10 minutes 
1974 USA FireBLEVE LPG 13 minutes 
1982 USA FireBLEVEs LPG 15 minutes 
1978 USA Fire BLEVE Isobutane, propane, 
propylene, butane 
20 minutes, series 
of explosions 
2006 
1972 
Italy 
USA 
FireBLEVE 
FireBLEVE 
LPG cylinder 
LPG 
25 minutes 
40 minutes 
2011 Japan FireBLEVE LPG sphere 1 hour 
1966 France FireBLEVEFireExpl. LPG sphere 1.5 hours 
1980 USA FireBLEVE Petrol road tanker 3 minutes 
1970 USA FireBLEVEs LPG rail cars First car: 5 min.  
6 rail cars in 40 
minutes 
1970 USA FireBLEVEs LPG 15 minutes 
1987 Australia FireBLEVE LPG rail tanker 15 minutes 
1974 Spain FireBLEVE Ethylene cryogenic 
trailer 
20 minutes 
1989 USA FireBLEVEFire Peroxide, 
polyethylene rail 
cars 
Peroxide car: 20 
minutes; 
polyethylene car: 
6 hours 
2002 Spain FireBLEVE LNG road tanker 20 minutes 
     
1972 USA FIREBLEVE Propylene road 
tanker 
25 minutes 
1973 USA FireBLEVE LPG rail car 30 minutes 
1970 France FireBLEVE Propane tank car 40 minutes 
1971 USA FireBLEVE 220 m3 Vinyl 
chloride rail tanker 
40 minutes 
1968 USA FireBLEVEToxic release Ethylene oxide 45 minutes 
2011 Spain FireBLEVE LNG road tanker 70 minutes 
1976 USA FireBLEVE Propane, isobutane 
rail tankers 
Propane tank;  
1.5 h later, 
isobutane tank 
b) The existence of a protection system. Active or passive protection can be very useful 
in certain cases to avoid or, at least, delay, the failure of equipment undergoing thermal 
radiation or flames impingement. 
Water deluge can be efficient to protect equipment subjected to pool fires effects, both 
for radiation exposure or flames impingement, as they are able to maintain a water film 
on the equipment surface (Table 7). With high momentum jet fires, however, a water 
deluge system should not be considered a good protection if there is flame impingement, 
as the high velocity of the jet will probably penetrate the water film and the dry surface 
will be in contact with the flames [32]. Fixed water monitors could be effective delivering 
a high flow rate of water just to the flames impingement zone [33]. 
 
Table 7. Water application rates from API 2510A [31].  
Exposure to radiant heat (no flame impingement) 5 L min-2 m-2   
Flame impingement (pool fire) 5 – 12.5 L min-2 m-2     
Flame impingement (jet fire)  12.5 – 25.0 L min-2 m-2    
 
However, water deluge systems and water monitors have some practical disadvantages, 
amongst which the large overall water requirement and corrosion/maintenance problems 
can be cited as the most important ones. Furthermore, they are restricted to fixed plants. 
Therefore, passive fire protection is often used, both for vessels and for structural 
supports, when the danger of jet fires is considered. A fireproofing layer can delay or 
even avoid the equipment failure. Townsend et al. [34] performed tests with full-scale rail 
tank cars containing propane, engulfed in a pool fire. An unprotected tank car equipped 
with a pressure relief valve (PRV), filled in a 94%, underwent a powerful BLEVE 
(content: 40%) after 24 min; another tank car, also with a PRV, filled in a 85% and 
protected with a 3 mm layer of intumescent paint, BLEVEd (content: 3%) after 93 min. 
Therefore, fireproofing can increase the TTF, thus allowing the application of emergency 
measures such as evacuation. However, the insulating protection can be damaged by 
erosion, by a mechanical impact as often happens in the case of traffic accidents, or 
because of the loss of insulating properties at high temperatures, especially in the case of 
jet fire impingement) [35], the temperature of the unprotected element can increase 
quickly to dangerous values. 
 
The existence of a PRV should not be considered a protection against failure if a jet fire 
impinges directly on the non-wetted wall. It will decrease the amount of material involved 
in the explosion and in the subsequent (if the material is flammable) fireball, although, as 
commented before, if the emergency lasts a long time the liquid level can decrease 
significantly, thus increasing the extent of the wall not wetted by the liquid, much prone 
to failure if there is flames engulfment.  
A few authors have proposed the introduction of some high specific surface material (such 
as aluminium foils) inside the vessel to modify the boiling mechanism, but their efficiency 
has not been proved. 
As a general approach, correlations have been proposed to estimate the time to failure for 
pressurized vessels [36], even though they should be used only as indicative approaches 
as their predictions can be modified by specific circumstances. 
7. Conclusions 
 
From this study the following conclusions can be drawn:  
1) When the first event triggering the domino effect sequence is analyzed for a large set 
of accidents, fires and explosions have approximately the same contribution; even if 
fires are more frequent than explosions, the higher reach of explosion effects increases 
their contribution to domino effect. The same proportion is found when all domino 
effect steps in the diverse sequences are considered. 
2) However, in the case of BLEVE accidents, fire is the prevailing first event, being found 
in approximately 70% of cases; when all domino effect steps in the diverse sequences 
are considered, the fire/explosion proportion is 1.7/1. 
3) Approximately half of the accidents associated to the fireBLEVE sequence occurred 
in transportation. 
4) The historical survey has shown that, if there is flame engulfment or impingement, a 
BLEVE can occur at any moment from the start of the fire, the time to failure ranging 
between one minute and more than one hour, depending on the circumstances. 
5) From the point of view of emergency management, such a situation should therefore 
be considered as very dangerous; people should be evacuated immediately and 
firefighters should withdraw to a safe distance. 
6) The existence of fireproofing and safety relief valves can contribute –but do not 
guarantee, especially in the case of mechanical impact– to increase the time to failure. 
A safety relief valve should not be considered a good protection against vessel failure 
if a jet fire impinges directly on the vapor surface; however, it reduces the amount of 
material finally involved in the explosion and in an eventual fireball in the case of 
flammable materials. These passive protection measures are important, especially in 
the case of jet fires impingement.  
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (project no. 
CTQ20011-27285) and the Autonomous Government of Catalonia (project No. 2014-
SGR-413) for sponsoring this research. 
 
References 
 
[1] Vílchez JA, Sevilla S, Montiel H, Casal J. Historical analysis of accidents in chemical 
plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 
1995:8:87-96.  
[2] Oggero A, Darbra RM, Muñoz M, Planas E, Casal J. A survey of accidents occurring 
during the transport of hazardous substances by road and rail. J. Hazard. Mater. 
2006:133:1-7.  
[3] Darbra RM, Palacios A, Casal J. Domino effect in chemical accidents: main features 
and accident sequences. J. Hazard. Mater. 2010:183:565-73. 
[4] Abdolhamidzadeh B, Abbasi T, Rashtchian D, Abbasi SA. Domino effect in process-
industry accidents – An inventory of past events and identification of some patterns. J. 
Loss Prev. Process Ind. 2011:24:575-93.  
[5] Hemmatian B, Abdolhamidzadeh B, Darbra RM, Casal J. The significance of domino 
effect in chemical accidents. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind.. 2014:29:30-8.  
[6] Cozzani V, Gubinelli G, Salzano E. Escalation thresholds in the assessment of domino 
accidental events. J. Hazard. Mater. 2006:129:1-21.  
 [7] Johnson A, Cowley L, Health, Safety Executive L. Oil and gas fires characteristics 
and impact. 1992.Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10068/667060 
[8] Muñoz M., Arnaldos J, Casal J, Planas E. Analysis of the geometric and radiative 
characteristics of hydrocarbon pool fires. Combust. Flame. 2004:139:263-77. 
[9] Moorhouse J., Pritchard M. J. Thermal radiation hazards from large pool fires and 
fireballs.A literature review. Institution of Chemical Engineers Symp. Ser. 1982:71:397-
428. 
 [10] Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems.  API STANDARD 521. American 
Petroleum Institute, 2007.  
[11] Mizner G. A., Eyre J. A. Radiation from liquefied gas fires on water. Comb. Sci. 
Technol. 1983: 35:33-57. 
[12] Moodie K, Cowley L. T, Denny R. B, Small L. M, Williams I. Fire engulfment tests 
on a 5 tonne LPG tank. J. Hazard. Mater. 1988:20:55-71. 
[13] Schneider M. E., Kent L. A. Measurements of gas velocities and temperatures in a 
large open pool fire. Fire Technol. 1989:25:51-80.  
[14] Cowley L. T., Johnson A. D. Oil and gas fires-characteristics and impact. OTO 92 
596, Health and Safety Executive-HSE. London, 1992. 
[15] Roberts T. A., Buckland I., Shirvill L. C., Lowesmith B. J., Salater P. Design snd 
protection of pressure systems to with stand severe fires. Proc. Saf. Environ. Prot. 
2004:82:89-96.  
[16] Palacios A., Muñoz M., Darbra R. M., Casal J. Thermal radiation from vertical jet 
fires. Fire Safety J. 2012:51:93-101. 
[17] Casal, J. Evaluation of the effects and consequences of major accidents in industrial 
plants. Elsevier. Amsterdam, 2008. 
[18] Lees FP. Lees' Loss prevention in the process industries: Hazard identification, 
assessment and control. 2nd ed. Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996.  
[19] Mannan S. Lees' Process Safety Essentials. 1st. ed. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2014.  
[20] Planas-Cuchi E., Casal J., Lancia A., Bordignon L. Protection of equipment 
eengulfed in a pool fire. J. Loss. Prev. Process Ind. 1996:9:231-240. 
[21] Landucci G., Cozzani V., Birk M. Heat radiation effects. In "Domino effects in the 
process industries, ed. by G. Reniers and V. Cozzani. Elsevier, 2013. Amsterdam. 
[22] Major Hazardous Incident Data Service (MHIDAS). In: AEATechnology, editor. 
London: HSE-Health and Safety Executive (U K). 2007.  
[23] ARIA (Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents). (2012). French Ministry 
of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy. Available from: http://barpi-
aria.preprod.addonline.biz/find-accident/?lang=en. Accessed 12.5.2014. 
[24] Major Accident Reporting System (MARS). (2012). Retrieved 10/4/2013, from 
Major Accident and Hazards Bureau (MAHB) https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?id=4. 
Accessed 12.5.2014. 
[25] Failure and Accidents Technical Information System (FACTS). (2010). TNO 
Industrial and External Safety. Available from www.factsonline.nl. Accessed 10.4.2013. 
[26] CSB (2012). Available from www.csb.gov. Accessed 10.4.2013.  
[27] NFPA (2012). Accessed from www.nfpa.org. Accessed 10.4.2013  
[28] CCPS. Guidelines for Vapor Cloud Explosion, Pressure Vessel Burst, BLEVE, and 
Flash Fire Hazards, 2nd ed. AIChE. New York, 2010. 
[29] Walls, W. L. What is a BLEVE. Fire J. 31 (1978) 46-47. 
[30] Demichela M., Piccinini M., Poggio A. Analysis of an LPG accidental release. Proc. 
Safety Env. Protect. 2004:82:128-131.  
[31] Planas, E., Pastor, E., Casal, J., Bonilla, J. M. Analysis of the boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) of a liquefied natural gas road tanker: the Zarzalico 
accident. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 2015:34:127-138.  
 
[32] Badri N, Rad A, Kareshki H, Abdolhamidzadeh B, Parvizsedghy R, Rashtchian D. 
A risk-based decision making approach to determine fireproofing requirements against 
jet fires. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 2013:26:771-81. 
[33] Bradley, I. Severe jet fires and vapor explosions: treatment options and the 
limitations of the existing guidance are discussed. Hydrocarbon Proc., 2012:May:T85-
T88.  
[34] Townsend W, Anderson C, Zook J, Cowgill G. Comparison of thermally coated and 
uninsulated rail tank cars filled with LPG subjected to a fire environment (Report FRA-
OR&D, 75-32). US Department of Transportation.  
[35] Salzano, E., Picozzi, B., Vaccaro, S., Ciambelli, P. Hazard of pressurized tanks 
involved in fires. Ind. Eng. Chem. Res. 2003:42:1804-1812. 
[35] Landucci G, Bubinelli, G., Antonioni, G.,  Cozzani V. The assessment of the damage 
probability of storage tanks in domino events triggered by fire. J. Hazard. Mater. 
2009:172:447-56. 
  
 
 
